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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
election officials. The citizen wrongfully deprived of the right
to vote can sue for damages."'
Where a valid petition for nomination was arbitrarily declared invalid and the plaintiff's name was not put on the ballot,
the Court of Appeals held a damage action would lie against the
individual members of the election board.2 In reaching this decision the court followed Frank v. Eaton,53 which also was authorhis
ity for the proposition that plaintiff did not have to exhaust
54
statutory remedies by court review of the board's action.
Thus not only can a citizen, wrongfully deprived of his right
to vote, sue, but also a candidate who has been deprived of his
rights.5 The bases for these decisions rest upon grounds of
public policy, the importance of the personal rights involved, and
the difficulty of vindicating them in any other way.""
I.

Busn-ss AssoCIAToNs

Corporations
a. Reimbursement of Corporate Officials: Sections 63-68 of
the General Corporation Law make up Art. 6-A which is concerned
with reimbursement of litigation expenses of corporate officials.
Section 63 does not concern us here; sections 65-68 are procedural;
section 64 reads as follows: "Any person made a party to any
action, suit or proceeding by reason of the fact that he . . . is or

was a director, officer or employee of a corporation shall be entitled
to have his reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, actually
and necessarily incurred by him in connection with the defense
of such action, suit or proceeding . . . assessed against the corporation . . . except in relation to matters as to which it shall be

adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding that such officer, director or employee is liable for negligence or misconduct in the
performance of his duties."
In Schwarz v. GeneralAniline & Film Corp.' a majority of the
Court of Appeals interpreted the court-mandated reimbursement
provisions of Art. 6-A as not applying to expenses incurred in a
criminal prosecution.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Goetcheus v. Matthewson, 61 N. Y. 420 (1875).
Schwartz v. Hefferman, 304 N.'Y. 474, 109 N. E. 2d 68 (1952).
225 App. Div. 149, 231 N. Y. S. 477 (3d Dep't 1928).
ELEmo LAW § 330.
.raffarian v. Murphy, 280 Mass. 402, 183 N. E. 110 (1932).
See Note, 153 A. L. R. 148; 29 C. J. S. Elections § 64 (1941).

1. 305 N. Y. 395, 113 N. E. 2d 533 (1953).
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Schwarz, a former vice-president and director of General
Aniline & Film Corp., was one of several defendants indicted individually with the corporation in 1941 for alleged violations of
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.' After having pleaded not guilty to
the indictment, Schwarz, in 1950, was allowed to plead nolo contendere. He paid a $500 fine and requested General Aniline to reimburse him but, the corporation declined to do so without court
order. The United States District Court declared itself without
power to provide such an order and referred petitioner to his
rights inthe state courts.
The Special Term, quoting People v. Daiboch&by saying that
"while a plea of nolo contendere is not an admission of guilt, it
nonetheless is a conviction and has the same consequences, in the
criminal cause in which it is entered, as a plea of guilty," ' 4 con-

cluded that the imposition of a fine amounted to an adjudication
that Schwarz was liable for misconduct in the performance of his
duties within the meaning of section 64 and refused to award
reimbursement.
Although the Appellate Division affirmed this decision,5 a dissenting Justice, declaring himself reluctant to agree that a plea
of nolo contendere necessarily showed any "misconduct" toward
the corporation, suggested that the conduct of petitioner might
even have been in promotion of the corporation's interests and
that defendant's plea might well have been a mere settlement in
the anti-trust suit, not involving any adjudication or any misconduct at all.
In the Court of Appeals, Judge Desmond, speaking for the
majority, injected for the first time the proposition that Art. 6-A
was not intended to apply to expenses incurred by an officer or
director in his defense against a criminal indictment. The legislative intent, he said, revolved around stockholders' suits in which
certain corporate officers and directors had to pay their own lawyers. This intent was found in part by referring to New York
Dock Co. v. McColtmG where it was pronounced that the corporation in whose behalf a stockholder's suit is brought was not obligated, at common law, to pay legal fees incurred by its directors
in defending themselves as individual defendants in such an action.
That case, which was concerned with a civil action, was a forerunner to the change in the General Corporation Law which tended
2. 15 U. S. C. A. § 1.
3. 265 N. Y. 125, 191 N. E. 859 (1934).
4. Schwarz v. General Aniline & Filn Corp., supra note 2 at 399, 113 N. E. 2d
at 534.
5. 279 App. Div. 996, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 146 (1st Dep't 1952).
6. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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to alleviate this burden on corporate officials. Therefore, the belief
that 6-A was directed to civil actions.
A further aid to statutory construction was found when the
majority viewed Art. 6-A as a supplement to Art. 6 which describes civil actions involving corporations and its officers. It is
thought that both articles are in pari materia and both refer to
civil litigation. In addition, "strange public policy" was the
classification given to any program which would allow one charged
with a crime to require the corporation by whom he was employed
to pay his legal expenses.
This approach by the majority, concurred in by Judge Carswell in a separate opinion, rendered it unnecessary to examine the
question of whether a plea of nolo contendere is an adjudication
of misconduct. Judge Desmond did add, however, that "it is
instructive . . . to look a little closer at the exception found at

the end of § 64, which denies reimbursement to a corporation official who has been adjudged to be 'liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duties.' We think 'negligence or
misconduct', as there used, refers right back to §§ 60 and 61, setting up civil actions by or on behalf of corporations against their
officers or directors who have injured
the corporations by wrong7
doing or inattention to duty."

This case raised two main issues concerning § 64, (1) its
applicability to criminal actions; (2) if so applicable, the relation
of nolo contendere and "misconduct."
While the latter is quite
unsettled, the 4-3 decision produced a definite conclusion as to the
former. However, this decision has attached to it as a permanent
fixture a strong dissenting opinion by Judge Fuld.
The dissent, in which Lewis and Conway concur, mentions
searching in vain for any limitation restricting the scope of § 64
to civil cases and uses an historical approach as one method of
sustaining the "plain-meaning" rule of interpretation. Before
1945 the statute was expressly limited to "any action, suit or
proceeding . . . brought by the corporation, or brought in its

behalf." A sharp contrast is illustrated by Fuld as he shows the
rejection of the former narrow language by a new section calling
for reimbursement in "any action, suit or proceeding."
In addition, the report of the Law Revision Commission'
which preceded the adoption of the broad language mentioned
that such language might include a "criminal" anti-trust suit and
suggested having a special proceeding for collecting such fees in
7. Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., supra note 2 at 403-404, 113 N. E.
2d at 537.
8. Report of New York Law Revision Commission, p. 161, n. 36 (1945).
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case a court, lacking equity power, would not be in a position to
pass upon the right to indemnification.9
Neither did Fuld find his interpretation to be repugnant to
public policy. He suggested that the cost of such a suit against
a corporate official because of his acts in the best interests of the
corporation might be considered as a normal risk of corporate
operation to be assumed by the corporation, whether the official
be acquitted or not. Siman v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co.10 is quoted

as providing court sanction for reimbursing a corporate official
for expenses incurred in defending a criminal anti-trust proceed-

ing.
The dissent sees also a flaw in the courts' reasoning when it

finds an essential difference between the criminal and the civil
in the area of anti-trust regulation.
Fuld continued by discussing the nolo contendere aspect. He
reasoned that a judgment entered upon such a plea is in the nature
of a compromise settlement and is in no way an adjudication
of any fact, particularly not a fact of misconduct as to a corporation.
As the law now stands, § 64 will not be made to apply to
criminal prosecutions." However, should the court reverse itself
at a later date or should the legislature indicate its intent is other
than as expressed in the instant case, then the effect of pleading
,nolo contendere will be in issue. The language of this case would
seemingly indicate that so far as the New York Court of Appeals
is concerned, a judgment following a plea of nolo contendere is not
necessarily an adjudication of misconduct to the corporation within § 64 of Art. 6-A of the General Corporation Law.
b. Liquidation: New York courts generally take the position
that directors of a corporation owe to their corporation, its stockholders, and its creditors a duty of promoting the interest of the
corporation by using good faith in business judgment. 2 A slight
variance is implied, however, when a corporation is on the verge
of insolvency.'3
9. The majority considered this a mere comment referring to a contention that
the section might be applicable in a criminal cause-but which view lacked any indication of adoption by the Legislature or even the Law Revision Commission.
10. 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 589 (1st Dep't 1944), affirming 179 Misc.

202, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 270 (1942).

11. See note I supra.
12. Rous v. Carlisle, 261 App. Div. 432, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 197 (1st Dep't 1941),

aff'd, 290 N. Y. 869, 50 N. E. 2d 250 (1943).
N. E. 2d 18 (1-042). GEN. CoRr. LAw § 60.

Everett v. Phillips, 288 N. Y. 227, 43

13. New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Weiss, 305 N. Y. 1,

110 N. E. 2d 397 (1953).
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In New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Weiss

et al.'4 defendants were sole directors and stockholders of such a
corporation. The corporation's inventory had a balance sheet
value of $73,000 and a cost value of at least $60,000; claims of
creditors aggregated approximately $52,000. Defendants arranged an auction sale in liquidation which netted slightly under
$20,000. Creditors had not been notified of the sale, and newspaper advertisements did not contain the name of the corporation.
Shortly thereafter the corporation was adjudged an involuntary
bankrupt. This action against the directors was brought by the
trustee in bankruptcy for the wasting of assets under § 60 of the
General Corporation Law.
The Court of Appeals was of the opinion that while the directors were under no obligation to give notice to each creditor of
their intention to convert the assets into cash, they were obligated
to obtain for the corporation the full value of the assets under the
circumstances at that time, the trustee having established a prima
favie case.
The directors were termed "trustees by statute for the creditors by virtue of § 60 of the General Corporation Law which
obligated them to protect the trust res . .
and account for
waste . . . if there was any waste by reason of their conduct.""
The language of the decision seems to indicate a preference
for liquidation proceedings under court supervision and to show
a desire on the part of the court to give full protection to corporate creditors when a corporation approaches insolvency.
c. Appeal to Stock Valuation: It is a general rule in New
York that ordinarily, a party who accepts the benefit of a judgment thereby waives his right to appeal. 16 However, a right to
appeal will survive the acceptance of benefits in some cases, most
common of which involve condemnation proceedings where the
claimant seeks to question the amount of the award he has received,1 7 or cases where the situation is such that separate claims
are dealt with in the same judgment. 8
In re Silverman 9 adds to these exceptions a stock valuation
proceeding pursuant to § 21 of the Stock Corporation Law. In
this case dissenting stockholders objected to appraisers' valuation of their shares. Special Term confirmed the appraisers' report and denied petitioners' request that the order provide that
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Ibid.
Id. at 7, 110 N. E. 2d at 398.
Alexander v. Alexander, 104 N. Y. 643, 10 N. E. 37 (1887).
Matter of New York & F. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 12 (1885).
Goepel v. Kurtz Action Co., 216 N. Y. 343, 110 N. E 769 (1915).
305 N. Y. 13, 110 N. E. 2d 402 (1953).
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they could surrender their stock and accept payment without prejudicing their right to appeal the valuation.
During their appeal to the Appellate Division, stockholders
did surrender their stock and receive payment. The Appellate
Division subsequently granted corporation's motion to dismiss
the appeal on the ground that the stockholders' interest was now
terminated.
The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of the language
of § 21 (6) of the Stock Corporation Law which states: "Any
stockholder demanding payment for his stock shall have no right
. . . with respect to such stock, except the right to receive payment for the value thereof.' '[italics added.] The majority of the
court held the word "value" to mean the "proper value" and refused to allow the language of § 21 (7) ("upon receipt of such
payment, the objecting stockholder shall cease to have any interest in the corporation or its assets by reason of his ownership of
the stock so paid for . . . ") to narrow its meaning. Such interpretation involves no inconsistency, the court maintained, because
subdivision 7 refers to rights such as to notice, to attend meetings,
and to vote and; therefore, it does not conflict with the right to receive "payment for the value thereof."
Bulk Sale---"ordinary course of trade"
To come within the scope of the Bulk Sales Act,20 a bulk sale
must be "otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and in
the regular prosecution of said business." "Whether or not a
particular transfer in bulk is or is not within the ordinary course
of trade depends on the facts of each case."'"
Sternberg v. Rubenstein22 presented an interesting fact situation in which plaintiff trustee in bankruptcy sought to hold Rubenstein, a dealer in leftover footwear, accountable for the value of a
batch of "off season" shoes sold to him by the bankrupt. 3 It appears that in the business of shoe retailing the sale of "off season"
merchandise, that rendered obsolete by the passage of time, is an
established operating pattern.2"
Special Term rendered judgment in favor of the view that
such sale was in the ordinary course of bankrupt's business. The
20. PmEs.
21.

PROP.

LAw

§ 44.

WHTNEY, OUTnINE OF THE LAW OF SALES 87

(4th

ed. 1947).

22. 305 N. Y. 235, 112 N. E. 2d 210 (1953).
23. The sale of 1,294 pairs of shoes represented approximately one-sixth of
bankrupt's stock on hand in money value.
24. Sternberg v. Rubenstein, supra note 22 at 240, 241, 112 N. E. 2d at 212, 213.

